ABSTRACT Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) has become a popular and promising paradigm in various sensing applications in urban scenarios. In recent years, some social network-based MCS systems, which utilizing the social relationship to recruit participants or perform sensing tasks, have been proposed. However, none of them have taken into consideration both the time-sensitive and Sybil-proofness, which are the two key problems for the MCS systems in the social network context. We present two social network-based MCS system models, and formulize the Sybil attack models for each model. We design two incentive mechanisms based on reverse auction, time-sensitive and sybil-proof incentive mechanism in multi-bid model (TSSP-M), and time-sensitive and sybil-proof incentive mechanism in single-bid model (TSSP-S), for each of two system models. Through both rigorous theoretical analyses and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that TSSP-M satisfies the desirable properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality,
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is a new paradigm that utilizes individuals or communities to collect sensory data together to form knowledge fragments [1] . It provides an attractive sensing mode due to the prominent advantages, such as wide spatio-temporal coverage, low cost, good scalability, and pervasive application scenario. Furthermore, it is especially suitable for sensing tasks that are with high complexity, huge workload, and difficult for machines.
MCS has shown its great potential in a variety of application domains, such as healthcare, mobile social network, environmental monitoring and transportation. Recently, researchers have developed many MCS based applications and systems in urban scenarios, such as Sound Map [2] for creating noise map, Smart patrolling [3] for road detection, WiFi HeatMap [2] for WiFi discovery, BatMapper [4] and SpeeNavi [5] for indoor localization and navigation, crowd-participated system for predicting the bus arrival time [7] , and SmartProbe [6] for network capacity prediction.
Although there are many MCS applications and systems, most of them are based on voluntary. In fact, incentive mechanisms [10] , [26] , [27] are crucial to MCS while smartphone users consume battery, memory, computing ability and data traffic [30] of device to sense, store and transmit the data. Moreover, there are potential privacy threats to smartphone users while sharing their sensed data with location tags, interests or identities. Therefore, the incentive mechanism, which computes payment for users to compensate their resource consumption and potential privacy breach, is a necessary component of MCS systems. Most importantly, incentive mechanisms also help to achieve good service quality since sensing services are truly dependent on quality of users and quality of sensed data.
However, most of the incentive mechanisms [19] , [23] , [28] assume that there are enough participants in the mobile crowdsourcing systems. In reality, however, many tasks cannot be completed in time due to the insufficient participation, especially in the large-scale city sensing scenarios.
According to the data of the fourth quarter in 2016 from Analysys [29] , only 6.02% and 3.83% of all registered users can provide the real-time sensing data for the traffic condition in Tencent map and Tianyi navigation, respectively.
To address the insufficient participation problem, some incentive mechanisms, which recruit social users from online social network, have been proposed. For example, Xu et al. [8] consider the compatibility of users in the online community for multiple cooperative tasks. Xiao et al. [9] focus on the makespan sensitive task assignment problem for the MCS in the social networks. However, none of them take the Sybil attack and time-sensitive into consideration.
This paper designs the truthful incentive mechanisms for the MCS systems in the social network context, and aim to solve the following two key issues:
• How to stimulate social users to diffuse sensing tasks in the social network quickly?
Despite the MCS is not a real-time sensing mode, the timeliness is very important in many applications. For example, the applications such as the crowd-participated system for the arrival time prediction of buses [7] and the Haze Watch [10] for pollution monitoring require the timely collection of sensory data and then predict events in the near future based on the sensory data. However, users in the social networks have different interest and online time, the speed of task diffusion is difficult to guarantee. Moreover, due to the lack of network topology of social users, it is unpractical to select the users with high centrality [31] as the diffusers.
• How to prevent social users from conducting the Sybil attack?
Most MCS systems require users to register with real names, which increase the difficulty of conducting Sybil attack. However, social users are not inherent registered users of the MCS systems, and it is difficult to verify the real identities. Moreover, it is convenient for malicious social users to conduct the Sybil attack because too much personal information and sensitive information are publicly released in the social networks. Therefore, the MCS systems in the social network context are more vulnerable to the Sybil attack. Based on the analysis of [12] , most of auctionbased incentive mechanisms of MCS are vulnerable to Sybil attack.
In this paper, we focus on designing time-sensitive and Sybil-proof incentive mechanisms for MCS. We model the interaction of task requesters and social users as a reverse auction process. The requester publicizes tasks in the social cycle. After receiving the task information, the social neighbors can also diffuse the tasks in their social cycle (act as the recruiters) or submit bids to the requester. The above diffusion process continues in the social network until a certain moment. Then the requester selects the winners from all the bids received and notifies the winners. Different from most of MCS incentive mechanisms, the recruiters who successfully recruit the winners will be rewarded to encourage social users to diffuse the tasks in their social circles. The whole process is illustrated by Fig.1 . The problem of designing time-sensitive and Sybil-proof incentive mechanisms for MCS in social network context is very challenging. First, due to the selfishness and rationality of social users, we need to design the truthful incentive mechanisms to prevent the strategic behaviors of social users by submitting dishonest bid price or to executable task set in order to maximize their utilities. Second, the incentive mechanisms need to stimulate the social users not only to perform the sensing tasks, but also to diffuse the sensing tasks in their social cycles. Moreover, it is difficult to guarantee the efficiency of task diffusion due to the diverse interests and online time of social users. Therefore, the incentive mechanisms should satisfy the time-sensitive, i.e., incenting the social users to diffuse sensing tasks as soon as possible. Finally, the social users may launch Sybil attacks. Different from the traditional MCS system, the social users who successfully recruit other users will obtain additional rewards. Therefore, the social users have the motivation to forge the recruited users to improve their own rewards.
The major contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) A novel MCS system is proposed to increase the potential participants by diffusing the sensing tasks in the social network. 2) We present two system models, multi-bid model and single-bid model for the novel MCS system and formulize the Sybil attack models for each model. We show that TSSP-M satisfies the desirable properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, time-sensitive, Sybil-proofness and social optimization, and that TSSP-S achieves individual rationality, truthfulness, time-sensitive, Sybil-proofness. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the state-of-art research in Section II. Section III formulates two system models and lists some desirable properties. Section IV and Section V present the detailed design and analysis of our incentive mechanisms for the multi-bid model and single-bid model, respectively. Performance evaluation is shown in section VI. We conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK A. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS IN ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORK CONTEXT
There have been many studies about incentive mechanism design for MCS through online social network. Nguyen and Nahrstedt [13] propose the notions of node observability and coverage utility score, and design a new context-aware approximation algorithm to find vertex cover that is tailored for crowd-sensing tasks in opportunistic mobile social networks. Xu et al. consider the compatibility of social users for multiple cooperative crowdsensing tasks and define three compatibility models through real-life relationships from social networks [7] . Chen et al. [14] consider network effects as a contributing factor to intrinsic rewards, and study its influence on the design of extrinsic rewards. Rather than assuming a fixed participant population, they show that the number of participating users evolves to a steady equilibrium. They design progressively more sophisticated extrinsic reward mechanisms and propose new and optimal strategies for a crowdsourcer to obtain a higher utility [14] . Xu et al. present the two-tiered social crowdsourcing architecture to solve the insufficient participation problem using the social network in online scenario. An online incentive mechanism, MTSC, which consists of two steps: Agent Selection and Online Reverse Auction, is proposed for this mobile crowdsourcing system [33] . However, none of the above takes the Sybil attack in to consideration.
B. TIME-SENSITIVE INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
Wang et al. [15] focus on the time-sensitive and location-dependent random arrival MCS system, and propose a two-level heterogeneous pricing mechanism to balance the participation degree of task participants. In addition, the authors proved that the problem of task selection of random participants is an NP-hard problem, and further proposed several effective greedy task selection algorithms to help each participant to maximize the benefits when selecting tasks. Cheung et al. [16] also focus on solving distributed timesensitive and location-dependent task selection problem. The users' initial position, movement cost, movement speed, and reputation levels are different. The authors developed the interaction between users as a non-cooperative task selection game (TSG) and proposed an asynchronous and distributed task selection (ADTS) algorithm for each user to compute her task selection and movement plan. Zhan et al. [17] propose a time-sensitive incentive mechanism (TSIA) for data collection of opportunistic MCS, where each sensor data has an additional time-sensitive value and it is gradually fades. Zhang et al. [18] use the data structure called motivational tree to motivate participants to participate in sensing tasks. The contribution model they considered is time-sensitive, which is different from the linear summation model in previous MCS scenarios. However, the above studies assume that there are enough participants to perform the crowdsourcing tasks, and are vulnerable to the Sybil attack.
C. SYBIL-PROOF INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
In most recent years, the Sybil attack problem in MCS has been studied. Zhang et al. [18] propose a Sybil-proof incentive tree mechanism under the submodular crowdsourcing model, which is more realistic compared to the linear summation model adopted by previous works. Lin et al. [12] propose SPIM-S and SPIM-M, and provide a sufficient condition for a mechanism to be Sybil-proof. Different from above mechanisms, we focus on designing time-sensitive and Sybil-proof incentive mechanisms for MCS in the social network context.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIRABLE PROPERTIES
In this section, we present two system models based on the bid modes of social users: multi-bid model and single-bid model. In the multi-bid model, each social user submits an independent bidding price for each task in its task set; while in the single-bid model, each social user submits a unique bidding function for its task set. The multi-bid model is suitable for scenarios, where each sensing task is independent; while the single-bid model is suitable for the correlative sensing tasks, and the cost of performing these tasks is related to the correlation between them. For example, in MCS, the cost of performing sensing tasks in close locations is usually lower than that far away from each other due to the existence of mobile cost. We list the frequently used notations in Table 1 .
A. MULTI-BID MODEL
We consider a mobile crowdsensing system consisting of a task requester and a set of social users. The requester first publicizes a set of m sensing tasks to his social neighbors through social network. All the sensing tasks need to be completed before the deadline TL due to the timeliness requirement of the requester. Each task t j ∈ T has a value for the requester. The social neighbors of the requester may submit bids to the requester or diffuse the sensing tasks to their social cycle to recruit other social users from the social network. Each social user can recruit other social users through task diffusion until the deadline TL. Task diffusion is a process to send the messages to notify the social neighbors of the sensing tasks. There are many studies on influence maximization in the social networks [32] . We consider that there is a set U = {1, 2, . . . , n} of social users, who receive the task information and are interested in performing sensing tasks after the task diffusion. They can participate in MCS through the reverse auction before time TL.
The bid for each social user i ∈ U is defined as B i = set of tasks that i claims to perform. b e i is bidding price of social user i for performing task t e i . The real task set i and the real cost c e i are the private information and known only to social user i. Let B = (B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n ) be the bid profile of all social users.
Let β S be the set of winning triples. A social user i is called a winner and added into the winner set S if it has at least one winning triples, i.e., β e i ∈ β S , i ∈ U , e ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d i }. For any β e i ∈ β S , the payment for winner i is p e i , and the total payment is p i =
. . , p n ) be the payment profile for each social user i ∈ U . To stimulate the social users to diffuse the tasks, any winner i s recruiter l i can obtain a reward r l i , which is determined by the requester. In order to encourage the social users to diffuse the tasks as soon as possible, the value of r l i decreases with the bidding time of the winner i. In practice, the cost of diffusing task to the social neighbors is usually very low, thus the value of the reward is small. Let the total reward for any social user i be R i , and the reward for all social users is R = (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n ). The incentive mechanism outputs the winners set S, the winning triple set β S , the payment profile p, and the reward profile R.
The utility of any social user i is defined as:
where p e i − c e i represents the utility that social user i can achieve when he completes task t e i . Since we consider the social users are selfish and rational, each social user can behave strategically by submitting a dishonest bidding price or task set to maximize its utility.
We define the utility of the requester as:
where v e i is the value to the requester when social user i perform task t e i . The social welfare is defined as:
The objective of the incentive mechanism is maximizing the social welfare such that each of sensing tasks in T can be completed. 
Remark: Although the real cost c e i , ∀e ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d i } is only known by user i, we will prove that claiming a different cost b e i cannot help increase the utility of i in our designed mechanisms. Thus, we still use the notation c e i in the mechanisms designed below.
To prevent the monopoly, we assume that all tasks still can be completed if any social user does not participate in the auction. This assumption is reasonable for MCS systems as made in [19] - [21] . If any task can only be completed by a specific social user, the requester can simply prolong the deadline TL or remove it from T .
Sybil Attack Model: The social users may increase their own utility by forging fictitious identities. If any social user forges at least one fictitious identity, we say that a Sybil attack is conducted.
We consider that there is a disguised cost c i h if any social user i forges any fictitious identity i h , who is selected as the winner in the auction, i.e., i h ∈ S. The disguised cost refers to the extra cost of using fictitious identity to sense and upload the data. For example, the social user, who conducts the Sybil attack, has to upload the sensing data separately with different identities in order to pretend as multiple users, leading extra energy consumption and data traffic. Therefore, the disguised cost will be generated only when i h is a winner. Let r l i h be the reward to social user i for recruiting i h . We assume c i h ≥ r l i h > 0 since the value of the reward is small. VOLUME 6, 2018 Note that the fictitious identity cannot obtain the extra reward since they have the same social neighbors as the social user i in practice.
Without losing the generality, consider that any social user i conducts a Sybil attack and forges k fictitious identities i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k to participate in the auction. According to whether the social user i participates in the auction, there are two cases for the Sybil attack:
Case 1: The social users i does not participate in the auction. The social user i submits bids only using the fictitious identities. The utility of the social users i in this case is:
where c i h is the total cost of performing the assigned task of fictitious identity i h . Specifically,
The social user i participates in the auction. The social user i submits the bids using both fictitious identities and the real identity of i. The utility of the social users i in this case is:
where c i is the total cost of the social user i to perform the assigned task, andp i is the payment of the real identity i. Same as case 1,
B. SINGLE-BID MODEL
Different from the multi-bid model, each social user can submit a unique bidding function for its task set in the singlebid model. Suppose that each social user i is with a task set i ⊆ T based on its interests and abilities. Each social user i ∈ U submits a bid B i = {l i ,˜ i , b i (.)}, where l i is the recruiter of social user i,˜ i is the claimed task set, b i (.) is the bidding function of social user i. Assume that the real cost function is c i (.), which is related to the tasks assigned to the socal user i, and satisfies the following properties:
These assumptions are realistic. The first property means that the cost is zero if the user doesn't perform any sensing task. The second one shows that the cost would be infinite if the user cannot perform the task he reports. This means that the user, who cannot perform the reported tasks, would be the loser since we minimize the social cost in our incentive mechanisms. The last one means the cost is monotonous with the task set.
The real task set i and the real cost c i (.) are the private information and known only to social user i.
Assume that all social users are multi-minded, which means they are willing to perform any subset of the task set hey submit. The requester calculates the assignment profile D = (D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D n ) according to all bids of the social users, where D i , i ∈ U , D i ⊆˜ i is a subset of tasks assigned to i.
The reward for any recruiter for recruiting any social user is a function about the assigned task subset of the social user and the social user's bidding time. Considering any social user is assigned a task subset M , the reward of the corresponding recruiter is r(M ). The reward function is determined by the requester, and satisfies the following properties:
2) r(M ) = 0, if the recruiter is the requester; 3) For any fixed M , r(M ) is a decreasing function about the bidding time of the recruited social user.
The first property means that the reward of the recruiter would be zero if the winner doesn't perform any sensing task. The second property means that the requester cannot get the reward since he is the crowdsourcer. The last property can guarantee the time sensibility of the proposed incentive mechanism.
The incentive mechanism M(T , B) outputs the winners set S, the assignment profile D, the payment profile P, and the reward profile R.
For any task subset M ⊆ T , let V (M ) be the value of the task subset for the requester:
The utility of any social user i ∈ U is:
where
is the total reward to social user i.
Note that p i = 0 if . In this case, c i (D i ) = 0 according to the first property of the cost function, thus the utility of social user i equal to R i .
Since we consider the social users are selfish and rational, each social user can behave strategically by submitting a dishonest bidding price or task set to maximize its utility. Moreover, the social users may conduct the Sybil attacks to maximize their utility.
Sybil Attack Model: We consider that there is a disguised cost function c (M ) when using any fictitious identity to perform any assigned task subset M . We assume c (M ) ≥ r(M ) ≥ 0 since the value of the reward is small.
Without losing the generality, consider that any social user i conducts a Sybil attack and forges k fictitious identities i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k to participate in the auction. The bids submitted by the fictitious identities are:
According to whether the social user i participates in the auction, there are two cases for the Sybil attack:
Case 1: The social user i does not participate in auctions. The social user i submits bids only using the fictitious 48160 VOLUME 6, 2018 identities. The utility of the social users i in this case is:
Case 2: The social user i participates in the auction. The social user i submits the bids using both fictitious identities and the real identity of i. The utility of the social users i in this case is:
C. DESIRABLE PROPERTIES
Our objective is to design a reverse auction-based incentive mechanism that satisfies the following properties:
• Computational Efficiency: An incentive mechanism is computationally efficient if the outcome can be computed in polynomial time.
• Individual Rationality: The reward of any social user is determined by external factors, and the social user cannot obtain the reward in some extreme cases. Thus, we say that the mechanism is individually rational if
• Time-Sensitivity: An incentive mechanism is timesensitive if it can stimulate the social users to diffuse the sensing tasks as soon as possible, i.e., the earlier the time for any social user to diffuse the sensing tasks, the more utility he will obtain.
• Truthfulness: For the multi-bid model, an incentive mechanism is truthful if any social user i cannot improve his utility by submitting false task sets˜ i = i or false bidding price 
end
• Sybil-Proofness: An incentive mechanism is Sybilproof if any social user i cannot improve his utility by conducting the Sybil attack, i.e., u i ≥ũ i .
• Optimization: an incentive mechanism is optimal if it can output the optimal solution for minimizing the
IV. INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR MULTI-BID MODEL
In this section, we propose a time-sensitive and Sybilproof incentive mechanism, called TSSP-M, for the multibid model. TSSP-M is a enhanced Vickrey Auction [22] by integrating the time-sensitive rewards to the recruiters.
A. MECHANISM DESIGN
First of all, the requester collects bids submitted by users within time [1, TL] . Then the incentive mechanism, which consists of winner selection and payment/reward determination, is executed. In the winner selection phase, we process all tasks iteratively. In each iteration, we select the triple β j i with the lowest cost from all triples as the winning triple. The task t j is assigned to the social user i , and i is added into the winning set S.
In the payment/reward determination phase, the second price payment rule is applied to calculate the payment of the VOLUME 6, 2018 winning triples. For each β j i , i ∈ S, j ∈ T , the corresponding payment is the second lowest bid among all social users, i.e.,p j i = min k∈U \{i} b j k , and the recruiter l i obtain the reward r l i , which decreases with the bidding time of the winner i.
The whole process is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
B. MECHANISM ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we analyze the properties of TSSP-M. Lemma 1: TSSP-M is computationally efficient. Proof: The algorithm firstly finds the lowest bid triples from all triples in the winner selection phase. Since there are n social users, and each social user can submit at most m triples, thus finding the triple with lowest bidding price from all triples (Lines 2-5) takes O(nm). TSSP-M selects a winning triple for all m tasks, thus the winner selection phase terminates within O(nm 2 ). In the payment/reward determination phase, the time complexity is determined by the forloop (Lines 10-13). For each winning triple, it takes O(nm) to find the triple with second lowest bidding price from all triples (Line 11). There are at most m winning triples, thus the time complexity of the payment/reward determination phase is O(nm 2 ). Hence the time complexity of the whole auction is bounded by O(nm 2 ). (p e i − c e i ) + R i , it is obvious that the payment and the cost of performing tasks are independent of task diffusion. Hence, it suffices to prove that diffusing tasks earlier can improve the value of R i = r i . Considering any winner i , the recruiter i = l i will receive a reward r i , and the value of r i is determined by a decreasing function of the bidding time of winner i according to line 12 of Algorithm 1. Hence, the earlier the recruiter i diffuses tasks, the more reward he will obtain.
Lemma 4: TSSP-M is truthful.
Proof: First, we prove that any social user i cannot improve its utility by submitting a false bidding price. Remember that the utility of any social user i is u i = Case 1: The social users i does not participate in the auction. The social user i submits bids only using the fictitious identities. According to formula (1) and formula (5), we have:
Because r l i h − c i h ≤ 0 for any h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, we have:
Since TSSP-M is truthful, all fictitious identities will submit the real task sets, i.e., i h ⊆ i , h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. Moreover, because of the truthfulness, all fictitious identities will submit a real bidding price, that is, for the same task, the bidding price of each fictitious identity is the same as that of the original social user i without conducting the Sybil attack. Further, the Sybil attack has no effect on the payment since the payment is determined by the second price rule, and each task is assigned to the unique winner according to Algorithm (p i h − c i h ), and u i −ũ i ≥ 0.
Case 2:
The social user i participates in the auction. The social user i submits the bids using both fictitious identities and the real identity of i. In this case, according to formula (1) and formula (6), we have:
It is not difficult to obtain:
using the similar analysis in case 1. Therefore, u i −ũ i ≥ 0. 
V. INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR SINGLE-BID MODEL
In this section, we propose the TSSP-S, a time-sensitive and Sybil-proof incentive mechanism for the single-bid model. TSSP-S first calculates the payments to each social user for any subset of his task set. To guarantee the truthfulness, the payment is determined independently of its own cost function. Then, TSSP-S assigns each social user a task set that maximizes its utility independently of the assignments to other users. At last, TSSP-S calculates the total rewards to each recruiter. 
The requester assigns D i ⊆ i to social user i, where D i is a task subset to maximize the value of p i,D i − c i (D i ). Excluding the reward, which determined by the external factors, the assigned task subset D i essentially maximize the utility of the social user i according to formula (8), i.e.,
Then, the payment of social user i is
Finally, the requester calculates the total reward, which is the summation of the reward functions of all recruited social users, for every recruiter, As defined in Section III-B, the reward function is a decreasing function about the bidding time in order to satisfy the property of time sensitivity.
The whole process is illustrated in Algorithm 2. 
end

B. MECHANISM ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we analyze the properties of TSSP-S.
Lemma 7: TSSP-S is individually rational.
Proof: According to the definition of individual rationality and formula (8) , it suffices to prove that u i − R i = p i − c i (D i ) ≥ 0 for any social user i ∈ U . Based on line 13 and line 14 of Algorithm 2, there will be
Lemma 8: TSSP-S is time-sensitive. Proof: Considering the utility of any social user i defined in formula (8) , it is obvious that the payment and the cost of performing tasks are independent of task diffusion. Hence, it suffices to prove that diffusing tasks earlier can improve the value of
Considering any winner k, the recruiter i = l k will receive a reward r(D k ), and the value of r(D k ) is determined by a decreasing function of the bidding time of winner k. Hence, the earlier the recruiter i diffuses the tasks, the more reward he will obtain.
Lemma 9: TSSP-S is truthful. Proof: First, we prove that any social user i cannot improve its utility by submitting a false cost function b i (.) = c i (.). The false cost function b i (.) can only affect the result of formula (12) . We useD i , D i denote the subsets of assigned tasks when the social user i submits the false cost function and the real cost function, respectively. According to formula (11), there will be p i,
. Therefore, the utility does not change. IfD i = D i , according to social user i's real cost function, there must be VOLUME 6, 2018
and D i are both subsets of i , and D i is the task subset that maximizes the utility of social user i. Thus, submitting false cost function cannot help to improve the utility of social user i.
Then, we prove that any social user i cannot improve its utility by submitting the false task set. Firstly, according to formula (11) , it can be known that the payment for any task subset M ⊆ i to social user i is independent of i s cost function. Assume that user i submits a false task set˜ i , and there two cases:
Case 1:˜ i ⊂ i . LetD i be the assigned task set to social user i . Based on formula (12), D i ⊆ i is the task subset, which can maximize the utility of social user i. Therefore,
Case 2:˜ i \ i = Ø. IfD i ⊆ i , the social user i cannot improve its utility according to the analysis of case 1; if D i \ i = Ø, the social user i cannot complete the task in D i \ i , and the utility of social user i is R i According to formula (8) . Therefore, we have
according to line 13 of Algorithm 2. This means the social user i cannot improve his utility by submitting a false task set˜ i \ i = Ø.
In conclusion, TSSP-S is truthful.
Lemma 10: TSSP-S is Sybil-proof.
Proof: We prove this lemma for the two cases of Sybil attack model in single-bid model, respectively:
Case 1: The social user i does not participate in auctions. The social user i submits bids only using the fictitious identities. Consider that the bids submitted by the fictitious identities are
Since TSSP-S is truthful, we havẽ
Let D i be the assigned task subset of social user i when he does not conduct the Sybil attack. We consider the case D i = k h=1 D i h , which obtains the maximum value ofũ i . We have (D i h ) ). For the fictitious identities i h and i h , we have
Thus, we have
Since TSSP-S is individual rational, there must be D i h = D i h = Ø, which contradicts the assumption. Therefore,
This means that the assigned task subsets of the fictitious identities are disjoint. According to formula (7), there
According to formula (11), the payment to social user i is:
The utility difference for social user i without and with Sybil attacks is: 
All assigned task subsets of both the fictitious identities and the real identity i are disjoint based on the similar analysis of case 1. According to formula (7), there is V (
. According to formula (11) , the payment to social user i is:
The utility difference for social user i without and with Sybil attacks is:
.We can conclude that u i −ũ i ≥ 0, and TSSP-S is Sybil-proof in this case.
The above four lemmas together prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2: TSSP-S is individually rational, time-sensitive, truthful, and Sybil-proof.
Remark: the time complexity of TSSP-S is O(n · 2 max | i | ), i ∈ U , where | i | is the size of task set submitted by the social user i, since TSSP-S will calculate the payments to each social user for every subset of his task set. In practice,
m, and we will show the running time of TSSP-S is still reasonable in section 6.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we compare the performances of TSSP-M and TSSP-S with two algorithms: MSensing [23] and MMT [19] . We measure the performance in terms of running time, social cost, diffusion efficiency, and truthfulness. 
A. SIMULATION SETUP
The simulations are based on the Facebook Dataset [24] , which includes 4039 nodes and 88234 edges. We assume that each round of diffusion (broadcast to social cycle) will consume one-unit time. Let m = 50, TL = 4 as the default setting. However, we will vary the value of m and TL to explore the impacts on the performance metrics. Both the number of triples in TSSP-M and the size of task set submitted in TSSP-S of each social user is uniformly distributed in [1, 4] . The cost of each social user is selected randomly from the auction dataset [25] , which contains 5017 bid prices for Palm Pilot M515 PDA from eBay users in Dec. 2012. Specifically, we set c i (.) =Ā * |D i | for any social user i in TSSP-S, wherē A is the average bidding price in the auction dataset. Further, we consider there are 500 users in MSensing and MMT.
We set the reward of any recruiter l i in TSSP-M as r
is the bidding time of social user i, χ ∈ (0, 1) is a system parameter, log T i + 1 indicates the time-sensitive diminishing to the recruiter l i . The disguised cost in TSSP-M is χ . For TSSP-S, the reward function for recruiting any social user i is r(D i ) = χ|D i | log T i +1 , and the disguised cost for using any fictitious identity i h ∈ {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k } to perform any assigned task subset D i h is χ|D i h |.
The rational social users would diffuse the sensing tasks as soon as possible in order to improve the reward in time sensitive incentive mechanisms. Thus, we set the probability of task diffusion for any social user at time q is 1 2q in both TSSP-M and TSSP-S. While TI-M and TI-S are time insensitive incentive mechanisms, and we set the probability of task diffusion for any social user at any round is 1 TL in both TI-M and TI-S, which is independent of the diffusion time.
B. EVALUATION OF RUNNING TIME
We first investigate the impacts of m and TL on the running time. From Fig.2(a) , we can see that the running time of TSSP-M, TSSP-S, MSensing and MMT increase with the increase of m, which conforms to the expected running time properties of four mechanisms. The running time of TSSP-S is much more than those of other mechanisms since TSSP-S calculates the payment to each social user for every subset of his bidding task set. However, the running time of TSSP-S is within 1.02 second when TL=4 (more than 2500 bidders) with 50 tasks. We extend the deadline from 1 to 5, and we can see from Fig.2(b) that the running time of both TSSP-M and TSSP-S increase since the auction includes more bidders with extended deadline, while there is no distinct change for MSensing and MMT since the two mechanisms don't diffuse the tasks, and the number of bidders is independent of TL. Fig.3 shows the impacts of m and TL on the social cost. The social cost of all four mechanisms increase drastically with increasing number of tasks. The reason is, with more tasks, the requester need to select more winners to perform the tasks, which incurs a higher social cost. Note that TSSP-M show great superiority in terms of social cost since it can output the optimal social cost. When the deadline is extended, the social cost of both TSSP-M and TSSP-S decrease since there are more bidders, and the mechanisms can find a set of winners with lower cost. However, the social cost of both MMT and Msensing don't change with different deadline since the number of bidders is independent of TL.
C. EVALUATION OF SOCIAL COST
D. EVALUATION OF DIFFUSION EFFICIENCY
To investigate the diffusion efficiency of our incentive mechanisms, we define task coverage rate α as the ratio of the number of submitted tasks to the number of all publicized tasks, i.e., α = | i∈U i | m
. Fig.4(a) plots the impact of m on the task coverage rate. We observe that both TSSP-M and TSSP-S always obtain high task coverage rate (more than 97% with 60 tasks). However, the task coverage rate of TI-M and TI-S decrease drastically with the increasing number of tasks. This is because TSSP-M and TSSP-S can recruit more users than TI-M and TI-S with the same deadline since both TSSP-M and TSSP-S are time-sensitive, and the diffusion probability is a decreasing function with time. From Fig.4(b) , we can see that the task coverage rate of TSSP-M and TSSP-S reach 1 when TL=3. This means our incentive mechanisms can cover the tasks quickly. In contrast, the task coverage rate increases slightly both in TI-M and TI-S since the diffusion probability is same for different deadline in TI-M and TI-S. We use the number of bidders under different time to measure the time-sensitivity of the incentive mechanisms further. Fig.4(c) shows that TSSP-M and TSSP-S can recruit more users than TI-M and TI-S under the same deadline. When TL=6, our time-sensitive mechanisms can recruit 82% more social users than those of time-insensitive mechanisms on average.
E. EVALUATION OF TRUTHFULNESS
We randomly picked a social user (ID=500) and allowed him to bid the price that is different from his true cost. As shown in Fig.5 , the social user's utility in TSSP-S is much more than that in TSSP-M. This is because TSSP-S calculates any subset of his task set and assigns him a task set that maximizes its utility. Moreover, we can see from Fig.5 that the social user can obtain the maximum utility when the bidding price is equal to the true cost. This means that the social user cannot increase its utility by bidding a dishonest price. Further, we test the truthfulness of submitted task set. We add the other tasks randomly to the true task set or remove the tasks in the true task set. The difference between submitted task set and true task set is defined as |˜ i | − | i |. We can see from that the social user cannot increase its utility by submitting a dishonest task set.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented two MCS system models to increase the potential participants by diffusing the sensing tasks in the social network and formulize the Sybil attack models for each model. We designed two incentive mechanisms based on reverse auctions, TSSP-M and TSSP-S, for each of two system models. Through both rigorous theoretical analyses and extensive simulations, we have demonstrated that TSSP-M satisfies the desirable properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, timesensitive, Sybil-proofness, and social optimization; TSSP-S achieves individual rationality, truthfulness, time-sensitive, and Sybil-proofness. In the future, we would like to explore the lightweight Sybil-proof incentive mechanisms for the large-scale mobile crowdsensing using the local edge servers of pervasive networks nearby mobile users [34] . YONGQI WU is currently pursuing the bachelor's degree with the Bell Honor School, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications. His research interests are mainly in the areas of crowdsourcing and blockchain.
